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 ABSTRACT
This essay examines the role of studying in determining future wages.  Much of the returns to
education literature focuses on the extensive margin by determining the benefit of an extra year of
schooling.  This essay examines the intensive margin.  This essay also analyzes other determinants of
wages, and how they relate to an individual's studying behavior and education level decisions.  The results
from estimating a structural model indicate only a negligible relationship between earnings and studying. 
A second finding suggests ignoring parental income as a determinant of wages considerably overstates the
returns to education.1
The Effect of High School Effort on Future Earnings
I. Introduction
The positive correlation between years of education and earnings is a well established result in the
labor economics literature.  However, the mechanism by which schooling determines labor income is
unclear.  In order to learn more about this relationship, many studies focus on the background
characteristics of youth.  Researchers examine the effects of school quality, family permanent income,
ability and a variety of other variables on achievement, education and income.  However, decisions of the
young beyond participating in education are ignored.  In particular, papers overlook the student’s decision
of how much time to spend studying.  This essay estimates a structural model that accounts for student
effort, along with background variables such as family income and skill.
Studies often examine the connection between earnings and school quality.  The relationship
between earnings, achievement and school quality variables such as teacher-student ratio and school
expenditure remains inconclusive.  In a partial survey, Card and Krueger (1994) find that a 10 percent
increase in school expenditures is associated with 1 to 2 percent higher earnings.  However, Hanushek’s
survey of the literature (1986, 1991) finds no relationship between school quality variables and
achievement.  Betts (1996) extends the number of school quality variables by focusing on the amount of
homework assigned to students.  His findings suggest that the standard school quality variables have only a
small effect on achievement.  However, a student’s achievement does improve as the amount of homework
assigned increases.  Betts argues this result implies that the extra homework will not only increase
achievement, but also future earnings.  This paper builds on Betts’ study by quantifying the effect of
studying on future wages.  
Section II of this paper provides a model that uses a consumer choice framework to postulate the















family income and skill have positive effects on studying.  It also finds that high school students study
harder in order to increase educational opportunities which in turn increases future wages.  Section III
outlines the empirical approach used to recover the effects of inputs on studying, and the effect of studying
on future earnings.  Section IV provides a description of the data and descriptive statistics.  From these
descriptive statistics one sees that without accounting for selection, individuals who study more receive
higher future wages.  Section V contains the results from estimating the model described in Section III. 
Results indicate that there are small returns to studying.  Also, the effect of income on studying is
negligible for both males and females.  However, neglecting family income as a determinant of wages
causes one to overestimate the returns to schooling.  Section VI provides concluding remarks.      
II. Model
To motivate the empirical work of this paper, I propose the following model.  Agents live for three
periods.  Over the three periods, agents care about consumption, leisure and years of schooling.  In period
t, leisure and consumption are denoted by lt and ct, respectively.  The years of schooling is denoted by Q.  
The agent discounts the next periods utility of consumption and leisure by a factor of $.  The education of
the agent’s parents, P, and the neighborhood of the agent, N, also affect the agent’s utility.  In each period
t, agents maximize the objective function in Equation (1) conditional on the information set St, over the
choice set Bt.
 The first period, agents face a choice set of consumption and leisure. In period two, agents choose2 Agents only choose expected leisure in the second and third periods because I assume that there is some
employer discretion in hours worked.  This is denoted by the *s on l2 and l3.
3
T1’s1%l1, T2’h2%l2%t(Q), T3’h3%l3.  
c1%$c2%$2c3’Y%$(Y%w2h2&K(Q,g,,2))%$2(Y%w3h3).
consumption, expected leisure
2, and years of schooling.  The third period agents choose consumption and
expected leisure.   
Agents maximize Equation (1) subject to the following time constraints:
In the first period agents spend their time endowment, T1, engaged in study, s1, and leisure.  The second
period, agents occupy their time with work, h2, leisure and school, t(Q).  The third period agents allocate
their time between work and leisure.  
The maximization of Equation (1) is also subject to a consumption constraint.
The agent saves at interest rate r, where $=1/(1+r). The present discounted value of consumption equals
the present discounted value of non-labor income plus earned income minus the monetary cost of
schooling.  Agents receive the same non-labor income, Y,  in all three periods.  This non-labor income
signifies a fixed proportion of the permanent income of the agent’s family.  Allowing the non-labor
income to vary over periods only complicates the model without changing any of the results of the paper. 
Agents earn income in periods two and three.  The earnings are denoted wtht for t=2,3.  K(Q,g,,2) is the
monetary cost of education.  K(C) is increasing in Q, implying that the cost of education is increasing with
the education level.  K(C) is decreasing in the agents Grade Point Average (GPA), g.  This has the
following interpretation; as  students increase their GPA they are more likely to obtain scholarships and
the consumption cost of education decreases.  ,2 corresponds to the  unobserved costs of education that the
researcher does not see, and that are unknown to the agent until the beginning of the second period.  3 Betts (1996) did not find non-linearities in the relationship between homework assigned and achievement. 
However, GPA has a minimum and a maximum.  Therefore, GPA cannot always be a linear function of
determinates.  However, I assume linearity holds by approximation in the interior.
4 Likewise, h3
* = h3 + 03.  03 is unknown to the agent and has a mean equal to zero.
4
g’B0%B1s1%B2X%B3A%B4Y%B5m%,1 (2)
K(Q,g,,2)’K1Q 2&Q(K2g%,2), t(Q)’t1%t2Q (3)
The first period represents time spent in high school.  In the first period, studying, skill, A, a
vector of investment goods, X, non-labor income, Y, and motivation, m determine, Grade Point Average,
g. 
Non-labor income, Y, is a proxy for unobserved investments made by parents.  Assume g  is an
increasing, linear function of  s1, X, Y, A and m.
3  The agent knows Y, X, A and m which make up the first
period information set, S1.  The researcher observes Y, X, and A but does not observe m.  Neither the
researcher nor the agent observes ,1 which represents a teacher discretion element of g. 
The second period represents early adulthood, ages 18-26.  In the second period the agent realizes
g and the exogenous second period wage, w2.  The agent then chooses an expected number of hours to
work, h
*
2, and an amount to save or borrow.  The agent chooses expected hours of work instead of hours in
order to allow for some employer discretion over the actual hours worked.  The employer discretion term
is 02 (h2
* = h2 + 02).  02 is unknown to the agent and has a mean equal to zero.
4  The agent also chooses
education level in the second period.  Education is subject to costs of time and money.  I assume the
monetary and time costs of education, K(C) and t(C), take on the following functional forms:5
w3’(0%(1Y%(2Q%(3A%m%,3 (4)
   I assume K1, K2 and t2 are positive parameters.  Equation (3) implies the time cost of education
increases with the number of years of schooling.  Also, the monetary cost of education increases with
years of schooling.  The equation also implies that increased GPA will decrease the price of extra years of
schooling, and the discount will be larger the more education the individual consumes.
The utility that an agent receives from Q is dependent on P, the education of the agent’s parents,
and N, the neighborhood or community of the agent.  I include P in the utility function because students
with highly educated parents might feel obligated to have a high amount of education and will increase
their utility as they fulfill this obligation.  Likewise, N is included because a student from a rural
community might not feel as obligated to go to college as a student from a suburban community.
The third period corresponds to adulthood, ages 26 and over.  In the third period agents realize the
third period wage, w3.  
w3 is a linear and increasing function of skill, A, motivation, m, the quantity of education, Q, non-labor
income, Y, and ,3.  ,3 represents an error in the knowledge of the employer concerning their judgement of 
the ability of the worker.  It is unobserved by the researcher and not observed by the agent until the
beginning of the third period.  I include non-labor income as a component in the wage equation on the
basis that this income is supposed to represent the wealth of an agent's family.  Students coming from rich
families will benefit from both the high consumption and the connections that come along with this
wealth.  In other words, agents with high non-labor income know the "right" people and use this advantage
to obtain higher wages.  
















The ", D and * parameters in Equations (6), (7) and (8) are functions of $, the K, t, J, 6, B and (
parameters, the time endowments and the mean of w2.   The L terms in Equations (5) and (6) represent an
employer discretion term in the hours the agents work, and are proportional to the 0 terms.  Equations (5)-
(8) are the solutions to a maximization problem when the following second order condition holds: 
It is precisely when this second order condition holds that increasing Y, A or P causes studying and the
quantity of education obtained to increase.















students.  Students sacrifice current leisure to study.  They study in order to increase GPA.  By increasing
GPA, students improve their educational opportunities.  The more education the student obtains, the higher
the student’s future wage.  However, wage is not only a function of years of schooling, it is also a function
of skill, connections and motivation.  The agent takes these qualities as exogenous.  If these attributes are
"low" then the model shows that it is not in the best interest of the student to increase schooling or study
time.  This is due to the convexity of  the indirect utility function in wages.  The empirical section of this
paper examines if the relationships found in this section hold true in the data.
Many assumptions were made to obtain these relationships.  The functional form assumptions
yield linear demand curves.  Also, the results that studying and the quantity of education increase with
family income are due to the fact that g and w3  increase with income.  This is because the utility function
is linear in consumption. Hence, there are no income effects on labor supply.  Therefore, this model is not
driven by the story that students from poorer families receive less education because of consumption
constraints.  These caveats aside, it is not difficult to derive the result that studying increases with income. 
The following set of equations provide the sufficient conditions for studying to increase with income.5 Such strong assumptions are not necessary for (12) to hold.  Overall, the result that studying increases
with income is not sensitive to many of the functional form choices of this paper.
8
xi is the Marshallian demand of the i
th good other than first period leisure.  Condition (10) states
that education is a normal good.  Condition (11) states that the benefits from increasing GPA increase as
the quantity of education increases.  If these two conditions hold then the marginal benefit of an extra unit
of studying increases at every level of studying when income increases.  These two conditions are
plausible.  It seems likely that an increase in GPA would allow a student to obtain more scholarship money
at a four-year college than they could obtain at a two-year college.  Also, education can be derived as a
normal good under flexible functional forms.  If condition (12) holds then the marginal cost of studying
decreases at every level of studying when income increases.  In the specification of this paper the
separability of utility over goods and time ensures that (12) holds.
5 
III. Empirical Model
This section presents the method with which I estimate the structural parameters of the theoretical











> ~ N(0,E)6  A more complete discussion of parent’s education as an instrument for years of schooling in a wage
equation appears in Rischall (1998). 
10
One problem estimating this model is that study time is not observed explicitly in the data.  I only
observe the interval in which the study time of an individual lies.  In order to estimate the study equation, I
use a grouped data regression model.  The grouped data regression model is similar to an ordered probit. 
The difference is that threshold values are observed in the grouped data regression case and they are not in
the ordered probit.  When estimating an ordered probit one scales such that the error term is distributed
normal with mean zero and variance one.  The scaling is not necessary in the grouped data regression
model, and the variance term is estimated within the model.   For the GPA equation a dummy variable is
included for each study interval.  To estimate Equations (14)-(18) consistently, I use three-stage least
squares (3SLS) because it is asymptotically efficient.  
The use of 3SLS requires exclusion restrictions equal to the number of endogenous variables
appearing in the right hand side of the equations.  The GPA equation includes the study variable.   The
model assumes P and N do not affect GPA.  Also, P and N are correlated with s1, but not with >. 
Therefore, P and N are appropriate instruments for this equation.  In other words, parent’s education and
neighborhood effects a student’s study behavior, but do not provide a direct investment into the student’s
GPA.  In years of schooling and second period hours worked equations, I need to make exclusion
restrictions for g.  In these cases, the vector X is an appropriate instrument.  Thus, household investments
such as subscribing to a newspaper encourage children to learn and obtain better grades in high school. 
However, they do not directly affect the choice of obtaining more schooling.  Q is an endogenous variable
that appears as a determinant of wages.  Appropriate instruments for Q are P, N, and w2.  Therefore, a
parent’s education affects a child’s schooling, but does not affect the child’s wages.
6  Lastly, in the third
period hours worked equation, wage requires an instrument.  The model assumes skill affects earnings, but

























effects I seek to estimate.  Furthermore, the validity of my estimates depend on the validity of these
assumptions.
 Beyond these assumptions, when one recursively solves the model one finds relationships among
the parameters of the model that must hold, otherwise the model is misspecified.  An overidentifying
restriction of the model is (1/(3 = "2/"3 = D2/D3.  
This restriction is used to test the specification of this model.  
IV. Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data come from the National Longitudinal Study Class of '72 (NLS72) data set.  This survey
contains observations on individual students, including how much they study, their GPA and their family
characteristics.  The panel includes variables on educational attainment and wage data for 14 years after
the students leave high school.  The sample excludes respondents whose high school curriculum was
primarily vocational-technical.
7  I make this restriction because the GPA equation for these students
should be fundamentally different from the equation for students with primarily academic curricula.  366
observations are lost because of this restriction.  Variable definitions are contained in Table 1 and8An equation where Hour2 is the dependent variable has also been estimated.  The estimates are not of
interest.  The equation was estimated for efficiency reasons.  The results are available upon request.
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summary statistics are provided in Table 2.  I will discuss the variables that deserve special attention
within the text.
Study represents the average amount of time the student spends studying in a week and is s1 of the
theoretical model.  It is the dependent variable of Equation (13) and is expected to have a positive
coefficient as an explanatory variable of Equation (14). 
GPA represents the high school grade point average of the student on a 0 to 100 scale, and is g of
the theoretical model.  It is the dependent variable of Equation (14) and is expected to have a positive
coefficient as an explanatory variable in Equation (15), and a negative coefficient as an explanatory
variable in Equation (16).
Education represents the quantity of education a student has attained measured in years and is Q
of the theoretical model.  It is the dependent variable of Equation (15) and is expected to have a positive
coefficient as an explanatory variable in Equation (17).
Wage2 represents the hourly wage of the respondent in 1976 measured in 1986 dollars, and is w2
of the theoretical model.  It is expected to have a negative sign as an explanatory variable in Equation (15)
and a positive sign as an explanatory variable in Equation (16).  In some cases an hourly wage is not given
by a respondent.  In those cases Wage2 is converted to an hourly rate by dividing by average hours
worked per week.  This could cause problems with division bias. 
Hour2
8  represents the number of hours a respondent worked during a typical week in 1976, and is
h2 of the theoretical model.  It is the dependent variable of Equation (16).
Wage3 represents the hourly wage of the respondent in 1986 measured in 1986 dollars, and is w3
of the theoretical model. It is the dependent variable of Equation (17), and is expected to have a positive
coefficient as an explanatory variable in Equation (18).  It should be noted that I omitted 26 observations13
based on the answer to the Wage3 question.  An observation was omitted if a respondent reported earning
over $400 per hour or over $10000 every week or $10000 every two weeks.  Also, the observation was
omitted if the respondent reported earning over $20000 per month.  In some cases an hourly wage is not
given by a respondent.  In those cases Wage3 is converted to an hourly rate by dividing by average hours
worked per week.  This could cause problems with division bias.  However, instrumenting for Wage3 in
Equation (18) takes care of this problem.
Hour3 represents the number of hours a respondent worked during a typical week in 1986, and is
h3 of the theoretical model.  It is the dependent variable of Equation (18).
Family Income represents the 1972 income of the student's family measured  in thousands of
1986 dollars, and proxies for Y of the theoretical model.  It is expected to have a positive sign as an
explanatory variable in Equations (13)-(17).  Ideally the Family Income variable should be the family’s
permanent income.  However, the 1972 income is all that is available in the data set.
Momhs, Momcol, Momadv, Dadhs, Dadcol and Dadadv are all dummy variables that represent
the education attained by the parents of the student.  These variables make up the vector P.  The Mom and
Dad prefixed variables represent education level attained by the student's mother and father respectively. 
The hs suffix implies the parent graduated high school.  The col suffix implies the parent has graduated
from a four-year college.  The adv suffix implies the parent has an advanced degree.  The omitted category
is for parents that have not completed high school.  These are explanatory variables in Equations (13), (15)
and (16).  They are expected to have positive coefficients in all regressions and the magnitudes should be
increasing in education level.  
Skill is measured by the mosaic score the student received on a standardized test given to all
respondents.  This variable is a proxy for A of the theoretical model.  It is an explanatory variable in
Equations (13)-(17) and it is expected to have a positive sign in all equations.
Table 3 compares the amount of time respondents study in high school versus the future wages9 For Tables 4 and 5 the study variable used is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the student studies more
than 5 hours per week.
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they receive.  The table indicates that among females the mean wage increases across study intervals. 
Likewise, the median and twenty-fifth percentile wages increase across study intervals.  The only point
where wages decrease across study intervals is in the tenth percentile.  The tenth percentile wage for
females who study more than 10 hours is less than the tenth percentile wage for women who study zero to
five hours.  Also, the table indicates that the wage distribution for females who study zero to five hours per
week is similar to the wage distribution for those that study five to ten hours.  The largest difference in the
two distributions is 51 cents per hour. 
The results are similar for males.  The mean wage increases across study intervals.  Likewise, the
seventy-fifth and ninety-fifth percentile wages increase across study intervals.  The only points where the
wages decreases over the study intervals occur in the lower tails.  As with the females, the wage
distribution of the males who study zero to five hour per week is similar to the wage distribution of those
who study five to ten hours per week.  However, the difference becomes large at the higher tails.
Tables 4 and 5 contain the correlations and covariances of the endogenous variables and Family
Income for the male and female subsamples, respectively.  The matrices are consistent with the theoretical
model.  Education and GPA are positively correlated with all endogenous variables with the exception of
Hour2.  This is consistent with the model.  The same is true for Study
9 with the exception of Hour2 being
positively correlated with Study in the female case.  Study and Family Income are negatively correlated
in both the male and female cases.  The only other correlations that are inconsistent with the model are the
correlation between Wage3 and Hour3.  These correlations are predicted by the model to be positive. 
In both the female and male sub-samples they are negative.  However, this result is typical in the labor
supply literature and could be the result of division bias.
The matrices capture the recursive quality of the model.  Studying is strongly related to GPA. 15
GPA is strongly related to the amount of schooling the student attains, and negatively related to the
amount of hours the student works in the second period.  Lastly, the quantity of education is positively
related to the future wages of the student.  Tables 3, 4 and 5 have shown that there is a positive
relationship between studying and future wages and a positive relationship between family income and
future wages.  The next section presents the estimates the empirical model described in Section III.  If one
believes the assumptions of the theoretical model then the estimates can be used to describe the effect of
studying on future wages.  
V. Results
Table 6 contains the coefficient estimates from estimating the study equation by the grouped data
regression model.  I estimate the equation for males and females under two specifications.  The first
specification is the standard specification of Sections II and III.  The second specification includes the
additional assumption that family income has no effect on future wages and GPA, that is B4 = (1 =0. 
Given the specification of the theoretical model, this implies that family income should have no effect on
any of the agent’s choices.  In other words, this assumption will imply that *2 = "2 = D2 = 0.  I estimate the
model under this specification because the only way family income affects studying in my model is
through it affecting future wages and GPA.  Income has been excluded to test this assumption.   
For the study equation, the results from the two specifications are similar.  All coefficient
estimates are of the same order of magnitude with the exception of Dadcol for males.  However, there are
many differences across gender.  For males all of the variables of P with the exception of Dadhs and
Momadv have the expected sign.  These coefficient estimates are all small and statistically insignificant. 
Parent education may or may not have a large effect on the amount of time a student spends studying.  For
the females, only the coefficient on Momadv has the expected sign.  These estimates, although for the
most part statistically insignificant, are much larger in magnitude.  Taking the estimates at face value, they16
imply differences in study levels ranging from one to 54 minutes per week.  The sign on the coefficient
estimate for Family Income  also differs across gender.  However, both these estimates are fairly
imprecise, and even taking this imprecision into account, family income has little effect on studying.  The
estimates imply  increasing family income by $1000 will cause studying to change by about a minute and a
half per week.  Thus family income does not have a large impact on a student’s effort.  However,
investments such as subscribing to a newspaper have a large positive effect on studying.  Lastly, the
coefficient estimate on Skill has the correct expected sign, and is roughly the same across genders.   
Table 7 contains the results from estimating the GPA equation by 3SLS.  Again, the results do not
differ a great deal across specification, although the coefficient estimates for the investment variables tend
to be higher when Family Income is omitted.  However, there are large differences across gender.  In
particular, the coefficient estimates for the Study variables are much larger for men than they are for
women.  Increasing studying from the 0 to 5 hours per week range to the 5 to 10 hour per week range is
associated with an increase of more than a grade and a half for males.  For females, the same change in
study level is associated with a negligible decline in GPA.  Also, for males an increase of family income
by $6500 is associated with an increase of GPA by more than half a grade.  An increase in income has
only a negligible effect for women.  Overall, the estimates are consistent with the theoretical model.  The
only estimates with the wrong expected sign are the ones for Newspaper. 
Table 8 contains the results from estimating the education level equation  by 3SLS.  Again, the
results  from the two specifications are similar, and most of the major differences are across gender. 
Almost all estimates have the correct sign with respect to the theoretical model. However, for women, the
coefficient estimates for Wage2 and Skill have the wrong sign.  Taken at face value, the estimates imply
that a full grade increase in GPA is associated with an increase of between a half and three quarters of a
year of schooling. For both genders, the coefficient estimate on Family Income is unsubstantial.  An extra 
$10000 in income is only associated with an extra month of education.17
Table 9 contains the results from estimating the third period wage equation by 3SLS.  The one
aspect that should be noted is the striking difference between the sets of estimates when Family Income is
excluded.  Excluding Family Income causes one to obtain an upward biased estimate of the returns to
education.  Although the estimate of the returns to education is not statistically significant when Family
Income is included, the estimate implies a 4.5% return to an extra year of education for males at the mean
wage.  This estimate is smaller than OLS estimates of the returns to education.  Also, when including the
family income variable for males, the results indicate that an increase in income by $1000 is associated
with an seven cent per hour increase in wages.  For an employee who works forty hours per week, fifty
weeks per year, this is an increase of $90 per year in wages.  Likewise, an extra $1000 in family income
for a full time female worker is associated with an increase in income on the order of $240 per year.  The
results indicate that family income is a determinant of future wage that should not be ignored.  Also,
excluding family income inflates the importance of education and race as determinant of wage.
One surprising result from Table 9 is the small positive coefficient estimate on the White variable
for males.  One would expect the wage gap to be much larger.  However, this result is consistent with
O’Neill (1990) and Neal and Johnson (1996).  O’Neill finds that after controlling for an individual’s
Armed Forces Qualification Test score (AFQT), the wage gap between whites and blacks decreases
significantly. Controlling for AFQT is analogous to controlling for the Skill measure in this paper. 
Without controlling for AFQT blacks are predicted to earn 88% of the earnings level of whites, all else
being equal.  However, after controlling for AFQT blacks are predicted to earn 97% of the earnings level
of whites, all else being equal.  Similarly, Neal and Johnson find that controlling for the AFQT score
explains most of the black-white wage differential.  They find that controlling for in-home investments
such as reading materials explains a large portion of the gap between white and black AFQT scores. 
Another surprising result is the large estimate of the effect of family income on wages considering
the estimated effects of family income on other variables have been small and statistically insignificant. 10 The estimates of (1 and (2,  are the coefficient estimates of Family Income and Education in Table 9.
18
This would seem to indicate that family income as a determinant of future wage is not the driving force
that the theoretical model suggests.  However, if 62 of the theoretical model is large relative to the product
of (1 and (2 then family income will only have a negligible effect on the choices of agents.
10
Table 10 contains the results from estimating the third period hours worked equation.  From this
equation one obtains estimates of the labor supply elasticity which are positive, but very close to zero. 
This is consistent with the findings of the labor supply literature.  Furthermore, from these coefficient
estimates one can obtain an estimate of 62.  The coefficient on Wage3 equals 1/262.  Using this formula,
one estimates  the value of 62 for males to be 1.24, and the value of 62 for females to be 7.35.  These are
much larger than the product of (1 and (2.  Thus, small coefficient estimates on Family Income in the
other regressions are not surprising.
Using the results from Tables 7 through 10, one can see the link between studying and future
wage.  A male student who increases studying from 0-5 hours per week to 5-10 hours per week would
increase GPA by more than a grade and a half.  This grade increase is associated with almost an extra one
and a quarter years of education, and an extra $0.75  per hour in future wage.  This translates into an extra
$1505 per year income for an employee who works forty hours per week, fifty weeks per year.  Assume
that this return comes from an extra ten hours of studying per week all throughout high school (144 weeks)
and consider receiving the same return for 35 years and discounting future income at a rate of .95 per year
then the return of an extra hour of studying is $9.42.  Hence, for males, there is evidence of a fairly
substantial return for studying while in high school.  However, this estimate is imprecise due to large
standard errors in all the estimated equations.  
A female student who increases studying from 0 hours per week to 0-5 hours per week would
increase GPA by more than a grade and a half.  This grade increase is associated with almost an extra year11  This a particularly interesting result when considering that the estimate for the return to an extra year of
schooling is not statistically significant.  Rischall (1998) uncovers the assumptions that drive this result, and argues
why this result reasonable.
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of education, and an extra $1.02  per hour in future wage.  This translates into an extra $2044 per year
income for an employee who works forty hours per week, fifty weeks per year.  Assume that this return
comes from an extra five hours of studying per week all throughout high school (144 weeks) and consider
receiving the same return for 35 years and discounting future income at a rate of .95 per year then the
return of an extra hour of studying is $20.49.  Hence, for females, there is evidence of a fairly substantial
return for studying while in high school.  Again, this estimate is imprecise due to large standard errors in
all the estimated equations.  Also, the estimates imply that if a female increases studying above 5 hours
then the returns to studying decline.  
  Despite the apparently large returns, imprecision of estimates is a problem in interpreting the
results from this model.  Many coefficient estimates have the wrong sign.  Furthermore, the positive
estimate of the returns to studying is dependent on all of the links between studying and wages having
positive signs.  In other words, studying has a positive effect on GPA.  GPA has a positive effect on years
of education, and years of education has a positive effect earnings.  Although, all of the estimated effects
are positive, none of them are statistically significant.
11  This leads one to believe, that there is really no
effect of studying on future wages.  
However, this assumes that the only effect studying has on wages comes through the indirect
mechanism that I have modeled.  It is possible that studying has a direct effect on earnings.  To see if this
is the case, I estimate models where studying has a direct effect on earnings along with years of education. 
The estimated returns to studying from these models are negative and statistically insignificant.  
Now the question becomes whether the small returns to studying of the original model are due to
imprecise estimates of small parameters, or due to a misspecified model.  In order to attempt to answer this20
question, the overidentifying  assumptions are used to test the specification of the model.  Previously, it
was noted that a restriction of the model is (1/(3 = "2/"3 = D2/D3.  This restriction is tested.  In order to do
this, a Wald test is used under the null-hypothesis, (1/(3 = "2/"3 = D2/D3.  For  males, the Wald statistic
equals 0.041.  For females, the Wald statistic equals 0.186.  In both cases the Wald statistic is distributed
chi-square with two degrees of freedom.  Neither null can be rejected at a five percent level.
VI. Conclusion  
The goal of this paper is to uncover the effect of study behavior on future wages and the
determinants of a high school student’s study behavior.  The model I use shows that there is an indirect
link between studying and future wages.  Studying increases grade point average, which increases
educational attainment, which increases future wages.  An examination of the data shows that people who
study more have higher earnings.  Also, the indirect relationships hold in the data. Studying is positively
correlated with GPA.  GPA is highly correlated with years of schooling and years of schooling is highly
correlated with future wages.  However, when estimating the model accounting for selection, one finds
that none of the estimated effects are statistically significant.  Thus, the results indicate studying has only a
small effect on earnings.  The correlations from the examination of the data, are driven by the fact that
highly motivated students study more and earn more.
Another result indicates that income has a substantial effect on future earnings, and that assuming
it has no effect greatly overestimates the returns to a year of education.  Overall, the main points that can
be drawn from this paper are effort level in high school is an unimportant determining factor of future




Study The average amount of time the student spends studying in a week and is s1 of
the theoretical model.  The question used in the survey is, "approximately what
is the average amount of time you spend on homework a week?"
The respondent could answer one of the following:
(1) No homework is ever assigned.
(2) I have homework, but I don’t do it.
(3) Less than 5 hours per week.
(4) Between 5 and 10 hours per week.
(5) More than 10 hours per week.
For those who responded (1) or (2), I treat as studying 0 hours per week. 
Studying 0 hours per week is the omitted dummy variable when estimating
Equation (14).
GPA High school grade point average of the student on a 0 to 100 scale, and is g of
the theoretical model. 
Education Quantity of education a student has attained measured in years and is Q of the
theoretical model.  
Wage2 The hourly wage of the respondent in 1976 measured in 1986 dollars, and is w2
of the theoretical model. 
Hour2 The number of hours a respondent worked during a typical week in 1976, and is
h2 of the theoretical model. 
Wage3 The hourly wage of the respondent in 1986 measured in 1986 dollars, and is w3
of the theoretical model.
Hour3 The number of hours a respondent worked during a typical week in 1986, and is
h3 of the theoretical model.  22
Table 1 Continued
Variable Definitions
Family Income The 1972 income of the student's family measured  in thousands of 1986 dollars,
and proxies for Y of the theoretical model. 
Skill The mosaic score the student received on a standardized test given to all
respondents.  This variable is a proxy for A of the theoretical model.  According
to the NLS72 user guide, "Mosaic Comparisons (116 items, 9 minutes).  A test
which measures perceptual speed and accuracy through items which require that
small differences be detected between pairs of otherwise identical mosaics or
tile-like patterns.  A deliberately speeded test, it has three separately timed
sections consisting of increasingly more complex mosaic patterns."
White Indicator of whether the respondent is white.
Momhs Indicator that the highest the level of education the mother of the respondent has
attained is a high school degree. 
Momcol Indicator that the highest the level of education the mother of the respondent has
attained is a college degree. 
Momadv Indicator that the respondent’s mother received an advanced degree.
Dadhs Indicator that the highest the level of education the father of the respondent has
attained is a high school degree. 
Dadcol Indicator that the highest the level of education the father of the respondent has
attained is a college degree. 
Dadadv Indicator that the respondent’s father received an advanced degree.
Newspaper Indicator that the respondent’s family subscribes to a newspaper.
Encyclopedia Indicator that the respondent’s family owns an encyclopedia.
Magazine Indicator that the respondent’s family owns a magazine subscription.
Typewriter Indicator that the respondent’s family owns a typewriter. 
Small Town Indicator that the individual attended high school in a small town.
City Indicator that the individual attended high school in a city.




Variable     Mean     Std Dev     Mean  Std Dev  
Study (0-5) 0.55 0.50 0.40 0.49
Study (5-10) 0.30 0.46 0.46 0.50
Study (MT 10) 0.05 0.22 0.10 0.31
GPA 81.44 7.11 85.25 7.26
Education 15.44 1.55 15.46 1.54
Wage2 8.51 9.18 7.90 6.74
Hour2 38.52 12.98 34.48 11.15
Wage3 13.46 8.59 10.76 7.39
Hour3 45.11 10.37 37.36 11.66
White 0.91 0.28 0.86 0.35
Family Income 33.01 13.48 31.87 14.17
Dadhs 0.53 0.50 0.50 0.50
Dadcol 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35
Dadadv 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.35
Momhs 0.68 0.47 0.65 0.48
Momcol 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30
Momadv 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24
Skill 49.15 14.83 51.64 14.97
Newspaper 0.92 0.27 0.92 0.27
Encyclopedia 0.93 0.25 0.92 0.27
Magazine 0.94 0.24 0.94 0.24
Typewriter 0.85 0.35 0.88 0.33
Rural 0.19 0.40 0.17 0.38
Small Town 0.27 0.45 0.29 0.45
City 0.24 0.43 0.28 0.45
Suburb 0.29 0.46 0.26 0.44
 # obs 1254 106224
Table 3
Wage Distribution by Study Time
      Wage3: Females
percentile
Study 10 25 50 75 90 mean # obs
None 4 6.05 8 10.5 14.29 8.53 57
0-5 4.7 6.5 9.16 12.5 16 10.32 530
5-10 5 6.89 9.67 12.5 16 10.8 557
MT 10 4.34 7.91 10.51 13.33 17.5 11.89 118
Wage3: Males
Study 10 25 50 75 90 mean # obs
None 5 7.92 10.45 14.8 18.5 12.12 161
0-5 6.24 8.75 12 16 20 12.91 786
5-10 6.25 9.19 12 16.5 22 13.96 405
MT 10 5.33 9.03 14.63 18.64 25.13 15.78 6825
Table 4
Correlations and Covariances Between Endogenous Variables and Family Income
Correlations in Upper Triangle
Sample: MALE     # obs = 1254
  Study GPA Education Hour2 Wage3 Hour3
Family
Income
Study 0.23     0.30*  0.20*    -0.07    0 .08*    0.03 -0.01
GPA     1.02 50.58  0.42*    -0.14*     0.17*     0.05 0.13*
Education     0.15     4.62 2.41    -0.26*     0.17*     0.02 0.20*
Hour2    -0.44    -12.95 -5.27 168.48    -0.04     0.17* 0.01
Wage3     0.33     10.30  2.27    -4.91 73.85    -0.18* 0.14*
Hour3     0.13     3.38 0 .25     22.91    -16.05 107.44 0.07
Family
Income    -0.08     12.50  4.24     1.13     16.00     9.65 181.65
* correlation estimate is significant at a .01 level (one-tailed test)26
Table 5
Correlations and Covariances Between Endogenous Variables
Correlations in Upper Triangle
Sample: FEMALE      # obs = 1062
Study GPA Education Hour2 Wage3 Hour3
Family
Income
Study 0.25     0.19*     0.18*    0.01     0.07    0.03 -0.01
GPA    0.69 52.73     0.39*   -0.04     0.09*     0.01 0.13*
Education    0.14     4.36 2.36   -0.18*     0.19*     0.06 0.21*
Hour2    0.08    -3.61    -3.05* 124.24    -0.004     0.03 -0.05
Wage3    0.26     4.97     2.13   -0.31 54.58    -0.05 0.11*
Hour3    0.17     0.87     1.04    3.59    -3.94 136.07 0.01
Family 
Income  -0.10     13.60     4.53   -7.50     11.18     1.36 200.87
* correlation estimate is significant at a .01 level (one-tailed test)27
Table 6
Dependent Variable: Study
Estimation Technique: Grouped Data Regression Model
Male Female
(1) (2) (1) (2)
  Constant 2.954* 2.923* 5.250* 5.269*
(0.71) (0.71) (0.74) (0.74)
  Family Income -0.015 --- 0.005 ---
(0.01) --- (0.01) ---
  White -0.578 -0.666 -0.240 -0.207
(0.39) (0.38) (0.35) (0.35)
  Dadhs -0.187 -0.240 -0.145 -0.128
(0.29) (0.29) (0.31) (0.31)
  Dadcol 0.128 -0.034 -0.850 -0.807
(0.41) (0.39) (0.44) (0.43)
  Dadadv 0.523 0.358 -0.533 -0.466
(0.42) (0.41) (0.46) (0.43)
  Momhs 0.372 0.326 -0.748* -0.740*
(0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32)
  Momcol 0.415 0.332 -0.900 -0.871
(0.46) (0.46) (0.49) (0.48)
  Momadv -0.036 -0.124 0.284 0.298
(0.54) (0.54) (0.58) (0.58)
  Skill 0.016* 0.016* 0.009 0.009
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
  Encyclopedia 0.191 0.145 -0.403 -0.402
(0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42)
  Magazine -0.199 -0.248 -0.265 -0.247
(0.44) (0.44) (0.47) (0.47)
  Newspaper 1.093* 1.021* 0.744 0.769
(0.42) (0.41) (0.44) (0.44)
  Typewriter 0.241 0.194 0.705* 0.718*
(0.31) (0.31) (0.36) (0.36)
  Small Town -0.356 -0.421 0.322 0.320
(0.31) (0.31) (0.35) (0.35)
  City -0.192 -0.257 0.082 0.088
(0.32) (0.32) (0.35) (0.35)
  Suburb -0.205 -0.313 0.149 0.164
(0.32) (0.31) (0.36) (0.36)
  F F 3.284* 3.288* 3.266* 3.267*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
 # obs 1254 1254 1062 1062





(1) (2) (1) (2)
  Constant 60.750* 63.722* 63.192* 62.236*  
(15.70) (17.37) (23.51) (24.08)
  Study (0-5) 10.859 7.606 15.514 16.884  
(20.01) (22.15) (26.39) (26.83)
  Study (5-10) 27.905 24.523 14.130 15.053  
(17.97) (20.18) (23.93) (24.66)
  Study (MT 10) 37.137 38.874 6.092 5.705  
(28.75) (33.23) (24.99) (25.83)
  Family Income 0.082* --- 0.018 ---  
(0.03) --- (0.02) ---
  White 1.243 1.958 3.140* 3.260*  
(1.40) (1.60) (0.94) (0.93)
  Skill 0.054 0.056 0.100* 0.103*  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
  Encyclopedia 0.560 1.162 0.528 0.481  
(1.54) (1.54) (1.12) (1.15)
  Magazine 0.147 0.245 0.374 0.457  
(1.45) (1.48) (1.11) (1.16)
  Newspaper -3.140 -2.281 -1.471 -1.213  
(1.73) (1.72) (1.09) (1.15)
  Typewriter 0.168 0.468 0.899 0.980
(0.98) (0.97) (1.21) (1.28)
# obs 1254 1254 1062 1062
Instruments for Study variables: Dadhs, Dadcol, Dadadv, Momhs, Momcol, Momadv, City, Suburb,





(1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant 8.352 6.743 9.414 8.241  
(8.16) (7.16) (5.61) (5.35)
GPA 0.072 0.093 0.060 0.077
(0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
Family Income 0.006 --- 0.009* ---
(0.01) --- (0.004) ---
White 0.076 0.111 -0.071 -0.054
(0.15) (0.15) (0.25) (0.25)
Dadhs 0.159 0.191 0.141 0.183
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
Dadcol 0.480* 0.528* 0.056 0.180
(0.22) (0.23) (0.17) (0.17)
Dadadv 0.451 0.487 0.542* 0.669*
(0.27) (0.27) (0.17) (0.17)
Momhs 0.278 0.275 0.441* 0.453*
(0.17) (0.17) (0.12) (0.12)
Momcol 0.503* 0.492* 0.786* 0.809*
(0.24) (0.24) (0.21) (0.21)
Momadv 0.322 0.375 0.537* 0.612*
(0.20) (0.20) (0.24) (0.23)
Skill 0.006 0.004 -0.002 -0.003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Wage2 -0.005 -0.002 0.010 0.010
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Small Town 0.225 0.315* 0.246 0.239
(0.17) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15)
City 0.403* 0.493* 0.141 0.164
(0.20) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18)
Suburb 0.387* 0.508* 0.187 0.239
(0.16) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14)
# obs 1254 1254 1062 1062
Instruments for GPA: Encyclopedia, Typewriter, Magazine, Newspaper 





(1) (2) (1) (2)
  Constant -1.135 -17.857* -6.703 -16.821*
(9.74) (8.26) (9.54) (8.03)
  Education 0.613 1.869* 1.098 1.838*
(0.69) (0.57) (0.66) (0.54)
  Family Income 0.073* --- 0.045* ---
(0.03) --- (0.02) ---
  White 0.144 0.499 -2.408* -2.208*
(0.81) (0.86) (0.70) (0.71)
  Skill 0.053* 0.041* 0.022 0.020
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
 # obs 1254 1254 1062 1062
Instruments for Education: Dadhs, Dadcol, Dadadv, Momhs, Momcol, Momadv, City, Suburb, Small
Town, Wage2, Encyclopedia, Typewriter, Magazine, Newspaper. * estimate is significant at a 5%





(1) (2) (1) (2)
  Constant 39.678* 41.384* 36.632* 36.559*
(2.27) (2.41) (2.58) (2.73)
  Wage3 0.404* 0.277 0.068 0.074
(0.17) (0.18) (0.24) (0.25)
 # obs 1254 1254 1062 1062
Instruments for Wage3: Dadhs, Dadcol, Dadadv, Momhs, Momcol, Momadv, City, Suburb, Small
Town, Wage2, Encyclopedia, Typewriter, Magazine, Newspaper, Skill, White, Family Income  
(Note: Family Income is only used as an instrument in specification 1.)  * estimate is significant at a 5%
level.  (standard errors in parentheses)32
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